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Abstract. We analyse the eﬀect of product market integration on environmental policy
incentives in an international duopoly, where national policy makers act strategically. If
traditional trade policy instruments are not available, environmental policies will typically be
determined by the interaction of conﬂicting policy incentives. Contrary to popular belief, we
ﬁnd that international product market integration, in this particular setting, might reduce the
need for transnational policy coordination, both from a purely environmental and from a
social welfare perspective.
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1. Introduction
One of the most important features of the ongoing process of globalisation is
the increased integration of national (or regional) product markets. Elimi-
nation of trade barriers through bilateral or multilateral free trade agree-
ments are accompanied by reductions of non-tariﬀ trade costs, such as
improved infrastructure and reduced bureaucratic barriers to trade. Reduc-
tion of non-tariﬀ trade costs is arguably the more important force in the
current process of international economic integration, due to the widespread
establishment of free trade areas such as the European Economic Area
(EEA), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Asian
Free Trade Area (AFTA). A recent example of an institutional reform that
implies non-tariﬀ trade cost reductions is the introduction of the European
Monetary Union (EMU).
The process of international economic integration has raised many con-
cerns among environmentalists, who argue that the consequent increase in
trade ﬂows will lead to increased pollution, and that increased openness of
economies will undermine the eﬀectiveness of national environmental
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policies. In particular, there seems to be a widespread belief – not only among
environmentalists – that international economic integration increases the
need for transnational coordination of environmental policies. For instance,
in a fairly recent WTO report on the environmental consequences of
increased trade, it is argued that
‘‘...the ongoing dismantling of economic borders reinforces the need to
cooperate on environmental matters, especially on transboundary and
global environmental problems that are beyond the control of any
individual nation.’’ (WTO 1999, p. 1.)
The aim of the present paper is to study the relationship between product
market integration and the eﬀect of environmental policy coordination –
from both an environmental and a welfare perspective – when product
markets are characterised by imperfect competition and national policy
makers act strategically.
In a world of imperfect competition, national policy makers typically
have incentives to use environmental policies strategically to pursue non-
environmental goals, for example to use emission taxes, or other environ-
mental policy instruments, as strategic trade policy tools. These incentives
are particularly relevant when free trade agreements have eliminated the
viability of traditional trade policy instruments such as import tariﬀs or
export subsidies. Thus, in a non-cooperative policy game, the chosen
environmental policies will typically be determined by the interaction of
conﬂicting policy incentives, so the environmental eﬀect of policy coordi-
nation is a priori not clear. In the present paper we analyse how diﬀerent
policy incentives interact in determining the optimal non-cooperative
environmental policies, with a particular focus on how product market
integration is likely to aﬀect both the environmental and welfare gain of
transnational policy coordination. Does international product market
integration increase or reduce the distortion of environmental policies in the
non-cooperative policy game?
The idea that imperfect competition in global markets creates distorted
incentives with respect to national environmental policy making is not new.
Early contributions to the literature on ‘strategic environmental policy’ –
based on the idea of strategic trade policy in Brander and Spencer (1985) –
include Conrad (1993), Barrett (1994), Kennedy (1994), Rauscher (1994) and
Ulph (1996). The main insight from this body of literature is that national
governments, when being prevented from using export subsidies or other
direct trade policy instruments, may have incentives to adopt lax environ-
mental standards in order to promote the competitiveness of domestic ﬁrms,
a policy that has been termed ‘ecological dumping’.1,2 By applying a model of
reciprocal trade – rather than the third-market model of Brander and
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Spencer (1985) – the present paper adds to this literature by studying how the
non-cooperative policy incentives, and the eﬃcient (second-best) policy,
depend on the degree of product market integration.
The two papers which relate perhaps most closely to the present study
are Kennedy (1994) and Burguet and Sempere (2003). In the former paper,
a two-country model with oligopolistic competition is used to analyse how
strategic interaction between governments can lead to ineﬃcient distortion
of pollution taxes in the non-cooperative policy equilibrium. However,
there are no costs of trade in that model, so the issue of product market
integration (or trade liberalisation) is not tackled.3 Burguet and Sempere
(B&S), on the other hand, use a related type of framework to analyse how
trade liberalisation aﬀects non-cooperative environmental policies and
welfare. However, they only focus on the non-cooperative policy game, so
the question of how trade liberalisation aﬀects the beneﬁts of policy
coordination is not an issue in their paper. We show that trade liberalisa-
tion – or product market integration – aﬀects not only the non-cooperative
policy outcome, but also the eﬃcient solution. Thus, even if increased
integration leads to a more lax environmental policy in the non-cooperative
policy game, it does not necessarily follow that the need for policy coor-
dination increases.
There are also other diﬀerences between the two above mentioned
papers and the present one. In contrast to B&S, who focus on local pol-
lution exclusively, we also allow for transboundary pollution, which has
important implications for policy incentives. Furthermore, whereas B&S
analyse trade liberalisation as a bilateral reduction of tariﬀs, we focus on
the eﬀect of non-tariﬀ trade barriers. Finally, in contrast to both Kennedy
and B&S, we allow for products to be diﬀerentiated, which turns out to
play an important role in determining the strength of the diﬀerent policy
incentives.
The basis for our analysis is an international duopoly model of reciprocal
trade, in the tradition of Brander and Krugman (1983), where a by-product
of the production process is the emission of a pollutant. The analysis rests on
the fundamental assumption that free trade agreements prohibit the use of
traditional trade policy instruments, so that the available number of policy
tools is lower than the number of policy goals, implying that policy makers
are operating in a second-best world, at the best. Thus, the analysis is carried
out under the assumption that trade costs do not comprise tariﬀs at all, so
that the process of international product market integration is driven by
reductions of non-tariﬀ trade costs. Furthermore, in order to make the model
tractable and reasonably simple – while still preserving the relevant trade-oﬀs
between diﬀerent policy incentives – we assume that the only available policy
instrument is an emission tax.
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In this non-competitive scenario, optimal policy making must balance
diﬀerent and partially conﬂicting considerations: ﬁrst, imperfect competi-
tion creates an under-provision problem, so there is an incentive to reduce
emission taxes in order to increase consumer utility. Second, in the non-
cooperative policy game there is an incentive to reduce taxes in order to
capture oligopoly rents from the foreign country. Third, considerations for
environmental damage yield incentives to keep emission taxes high. The
strength of these partly conﬂicting policy incentives, as well as the eﬀect of
policy coordination, depend – in diﬀerent ways – on the degree of product
market integration. Stronger integration increases competition, implying
that considerations for consumer utility reduce the downward pressure on
emission taxes when national policies are coordinated. The relationship
between integration and the coordination eﬀect on the two other policy
incentives are, however, ambiguous. Regarding the incentives for reducing
environmental pollution, increased integration actually reduces the upward
pressure on emission taxes when policies are coordinated, provided that
pollution is predominantly local. In this case, non-cooperative policy
making tends to yield excessively high taxes due to incentives for ‘pollution-
shifting’, and these incentives are reinforced when product markets are
integrated.
The main message of the paper is that product market integration does
not necessarily increase the need for transnational policy coordination,
neither from a purely environmental nor from a social welfare point of
view. On the contrary, if the marginal social cost of pollution is constant
and there is a certain degree of product diﬀerentiation, product market
integration always reduces the environmental gain of policy coordination,
while the welfare gain is reduced if coordination leads to higher emission
taxes. On the other hand, with a quadratic social damage cost function,
integration reduces both the environmental and welfare gains of policy
coordination if products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated and pollution is
predominantly local. Given that policy coordination reduces pollution, this
means that the process of product market integration in these cases reduces
the policy distortions in the non-cooperative policy game and moves the
non-cooperative equilibrium closer to the eﬃcient (second-best) solution, in
terms of equilibrium emission tax levels. There are two main eﬀects that
contribute to these results. In addition to the above mentioned ‘pollution-
shifting’ eﬀect, which applies when pollution is suﬃciently local in nature,
product market integration also reduces the incentive to keep emission
taxes high in the coordination regime in order to curtail the total outlay on
trade costs.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we
present the fundamental ingredients of the model. In Section 3, the
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non-cooperative equilibrium is derived, and we also consider the eﬀect of
product market integration on non-cooperative equilibrium policies. In
Section 4 we analyse the environmental eﬀect of a transnational coordination
of national policies, and examine under which circumstances policy coordi-
nation is likely to reduce total pollution. Section 5 contains the main con-
tribution of the paper. Here we analyse how product market integration
inﬂuences the eﬀect of policy coordination on environmental policies, and
subsequently evaluate how integration aﬀects the environmental and welfare
gains of transnational policy coordination. Finally, some concluding
remarks, including an elaborate discussion of alternative modelling
assumptions, are oﬀered in Section 6.
2. Model
Consider a symmetric international duopoly – with ﬁrm i located in country i,
i=1, 2 – where each ﬁrm produces its own variant of a diﬀerentiated product.
The preferences of a representative consumer in country i is given by a quasi-
linear utility function
Ui ¼ qii þ qij 
1
2
ðqiiÞ2 þ ðqijÞ2 þ 2bqiiqij
h i
þ y; ð1Þ
where qj
i is the quantity supplied in country i by ﬁrm j, and y is a numeraire
good. With a ﬁxed income, utility maximisation then yields the following
inverse demand functions:
pii ¼ 1 qii  bqij; ð2Þ
pij ¼ 1 qij  bqii; ð3Þ
i, j=1, 2, i „ j, where pji is the price of good j (produced by ﬁrm j) in country
i.4 The parameter b2 [0,1] is a measure of the degree of product diﬀerenti-
ation, where b=1 implies that the goods are homogeneous.
The ﬁrms act as Cournot players, and we also adopt the market seg-
mentation hypothesis, implying that each ﬁrm chooses its optimal supply
of the good for each market separately. There are no ﬁxed costs, and
marginal production costs are assumed to be constant and equal for both
ﬁrms. Without loss of generality, these costs are set equal to zero. There
are also some trade costs associated with exports: we assume that each
ﬁrm has to pay a per-unit cost t for goods supplied to the foreign market.
This cost parameter encompasses all non-tariﬀ costs associated with
serving a foreign market, such as transportation costs, red tape and
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various regulatory requirements that complicate and/or delay the trading
process.
Production of the goods causes emissions of a pollutant. However, the
ﬁrms have technology available for abating this pollutant, Following Ulph
(1996), and others, we choose units such that for output levels qi
j and
abatement level ai, emissions from ﬁrm i are given by
Ei ¼
X
j
qji  ai; i; j ¼ 1; 2: ð4Þ
Abatement costs for ﬁrm i is given by a convex cost function Ci(ai).
For simplicity, we let this function take on a simple quadratic form:
Ci ¼ c2 a2i . An interior solution with respect to equilibrium abatement levels
(i.e., ai<
P
jqi
j) require that c is suﬃciently large. We follow the speciﬁ-
cation in Kennedy (1994) and assume that total pollution in country i, Wi,
is given by
Xi ¼ Ei þ aEj; i; j ¼ 1; 2; i 6¼ j; ð5Þ
where the parameter a2 [0, 1] indicates the degree to which pollution is
transboundary. If a=0, pollution is purely local, whereas a=1 implies that
pollution is completely transboundary.5
Pollution causes environmental damage, and the social evaluation of these
costs is given by a damage cost function Di:=D(Wi), where D¢ (Æ)>0 and
D¢¢(Æ) ‡ 0. Each national policy maker can inﬂuence the total level of emis-
sions by levying an emission tax s on the domestic ﬁrm. We deﬁne social
welfare in country i as the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surplus, net of
social pollution costs:
Wi ¼ Ui  piiqii þ pijqij
 
þ pi þ siEi Di i ¼ 1; 2; ð6Þ
where si Ei is emission tax revenue for the government in country i, and pi
denotes the proﬁts of ﬁrm i, given by
pi ¼ piiqii þ pij  t
 
qi
j  siEi  Ci i; j ¼ 1; 2; i 6¼ j: ð7Þ
The game is played in two stages:
• Stage 1: the governments in the two countries decide – cooperatively or
non-cooperatively – on the environmental policy by setting emission
taxes.
• Stage 2: the ﬁrms compete in Cournot fashion by choosing – non-
cooperatively – abatement levels and output quantities for each market.
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3. Non-cooperative Policy Making
For given national policies (si,sj), we can ﬁnd the equilibrium levels of
abatement, and output for each market, by simultaneously solving the ﬁrms’
proﬁt maximisation problems, yielding
qii ¼
2 bþ btþ bsj  2si
4 b2 ; ð8Þ
qji ¼
2 bþ 2tþ bsj  2si
4 b2 ; ð9Þ
ai ¼ 1
c
si; ð10Þ
i, j=1, 2, i „ j. In equilibrium, we see that each ﬁrm abates pollution to the
point where marginal abatement costs equal the emission tax rate. We will
assume throughout that the equilibrium implies two-way trade. From (9) we
see that this requires trade costs to be below a certain prohibitive level.6
Anticipating the outcome of the production game, the national policy
makers simultaneously and non-cooperatively set emission taxes to maximise
(domestic) social welfare. For the subsequent analysis, it will be useful to
reformulate the social welfare function in the following way:
Wi ¼ Ui þ Si Di  Ci; ð11Þ
where
Si :¼ pji  t
 
qji  pijqij ð12Þ
is the net trade surplus for country i.7 The ﬁrst-order condition for an
optimal tax rate in country i is then given by
@Wi si; sj
 
@si
¼ @U
i si; sj
 
@si
þ @S
i si; sj
 
@si
 @D
i si; sj
 
@si
 @Ci sið Þ
@si
¼ 0: ð13Þ
When setting an optimal emission tax rate, each government has to balance
four diﬀerent considerations: consumer utility, net trade surplus, environ-
mental damage and abatement costs. In order better to grasp the intuition for
the main results of the model, we will proceed by taking a more in-depth look
at the decomposed eﬀects of the ﬁrst-order condition, evaluated at the
symmetric equilibrium s1=s2=snc. Although negative taxes are possible, we
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will assume – for clarity of the subsequent discussion – that the policy
equilibrium yields strictly positive emission taxes, which essentially requires
that the social cost of pollution is suﬃciently high.
Consumer utility. By inserting the equilibrium expressions from stage two
of the game, we derive8
@Ui sncð Þ
@si
¼  2 bð Þ
2 1þ snc 1þ bð Þð Þ þ b3t
2 bð Þ2 2þ bð Þ2 <0: ð14Þ
Thus, considerations for consumer utility pull in the direction of lower
emission taxes. This is of course due to the fact that imperfect competition
creates an under-provision problem when environmental damages are not
taken into account.9
Net trade surplus. At the non-cooperative equilibrium we have that
@Si sncð Þ
@si
¼  2 bð Þ 2snc þ bð Þ  tb
2
2 bð Þ2 2þ bð Þ <0: ð15Þ
By increasing taxes for the domestic ﬁrm, rents are shifted to the foreign
country. Thus, considerations for the net trade surplus – the strategic trade
policy incentives – also pull in the direction of a more lax environmental
policy.
Environmental damage. Once more, by inserting the equilibrium expres-
sion from the production subgame, we derive
 @D
i sncð Þ
@si
¼ D0 ð Þ 2 2 abð Þ
4 b2 þ
1
c
 
>0; ð16Þ
which illustrates the environmental gains from emission taxation.
Increased taxation reduces production and thus pollution. We see that the
environmental gain of emission taxes increases if abatement becomes less
costly. Note also that a lower value of a yields incentives for a tougher
environmental policy (i.e., higher emission taxes). If pollution is predom-
inantly local, uncoordinated taxation implies that each government has an
incentive to use the tax instrument to shift (polluting) production to the
other country.10
Abatement costs. The eﬀect of emission taxes on abatement costs is
straightforward. In equilibrium, we have that
 @C
i sncð Þ
si
¼  snc
c
<0; ð17Þ
implying that a higher emission tax rate will increase abatement and thus
total abatement costs.
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3.1. NON-COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM TAX RATES
Using (14)–(16), the equilibrium non-cooperative emission tax rate is char-
acterised by the following equation:
 4þ b
2 1 b 2tð Þ þ snc 2 bð Þ 6þ 3b b2
  
4 b2ð Þ2
þD0 ð Þ 2 2 abð Þ
4 b2ð Þ þ
1
c
D0 ð Þ  snc½  ¼ 0:
ð18Þ
We can solve explicitly for the equilibrium tax rate by considering two special
cases; linear and quadratic damage costs. For the linear case, assume that
Di=dWi. Solving (18) yields an equilibrium tax rate, snc, given by
snc ¼
d 2þ bð Þ 4þ 2c 2 bað Þ  b2  c 2þ bþ b2  2tb22bð Þ
 
2 bð Þ 2þ bð Þ2þc 6þ 3b b2ð Þ : ð19Þ
For the quadratic case, assume that Di ¼ d2 ðXiÞ2. In this case, the equilibrium
tax rate, ~snc, is given by
~snc¼
c d 2tð Þ 1það Þ 4þ2c 2bað Þb2 c 2þbþb2 2tb22bð Þ
  
d 2þbþ2cð Þ 1það Þ 4þ2c 2bað Þb2ð Þþc 2þbð Þ 4þ3cð Þcb2 2þbþcð Þ:
ð20Þ
3.2. PRODUCT MARKET INTEGRATION
Before analysing the eﬀects of policy coordination, let us see how product
market integration – interpreted as (marginal) reduction of trade costs –
aﬀects the uncoordinated policy equilibrium. The direction of change can be
evaluated by diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst order condition with respect to t while
holding the equilibrium tax level snc, constant. Once more, it is useful to start
out by discussing the decomposed eﬀects. From (14) we easily see that
@2Ui sncð Þ
@t@si
<0; ð21Þ
which implies that integration reduces the negative eﬀect of increased taxa-
tion on consumer utility. This is due to the fact that product market inte-
gration increases the degree of competition, and thus total output, which
alleviates the under-provision problem. Ceteris paribus, a reduction of trade
costs leads then to a tougher environmental policy.
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From (15) it is also easily seen that
@2Si sncð Þ
@t@si
>0; ð22Þ
which implies that integration increases incentives for rent-shifting activity by
the governments. The reason is simply that lower trade costs make it easier to
capture rents from the foreign market. Ceteris paribus, this means that trade
cost reductions encourage a more lax environmental policy.
From (16) we can derive
 @
2Di sncð Þ
@t@si
¼ D00 ð Þ 1þ að Þ
2þ bð Þ
2 2 abð Þ
4 b2ð Þ þ
1
c
 
 0: ð23Þ
Lower trade costs increase total production and thus pollution. This is the so-
called ‘scale eﬀect’ of product market integration. If the damage cost function
is strictly convex, this means that the social beneﬁt of reducing pollution
increases as a result of reduced trade costs. Thus, environmental consider-
ations call for a tougher environmental policy when product markets become
more integrated, as long as the marginal social cost of pollution is increasing.
Finally, we see from (17) that the eﬀect of environmental taxation on total
abatement costs are independent of trade costs. The overall eﬀect of trade
cost reductions on the equilibrium emission tax rate is found by total dif-
ferentiation of (18), yielding
@snc
@t
¼
c 2 b
2
2b
 
c w
 
c2 6þ 3b b2ð Þ þ c 2 bð Þ 2þ bð Þ2þ 2 1þ cð Þ þ bð Þw ; ð24Þ
where
w :¼ D00 ð Þ 1þ að Þ 2c 2 bað Þ þ 4 b2    0:
The following result follows straightforwardly from (24):
Proposition 1. In the non-cooperative equilibrium, product market integration
always leads to a more lax environmental policy if the marginal social cost of
pollution is constant. With a strictly convex damage cost function, product
market integration always leads to a tougher environmental policy if b is suf-
ﬁciently close to zero.
If the damage cost function is linear, trade cost reduction does not inﬂuence
how environmental considerations aﬀect the optimal policy; only incentives
for rent-shifting and increasing consumer utility are aﬀected. It turns out that
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the rent-shifting eﬀect dominates, implying that integration leads to lower
emission taxes, because incentives for rent-shifting are suﬃciently strength-
ened. The strength of both eﬀects are, however, determined by the degree of
product diﬀerentiation. For instance, the higher the degree of product diﬀer-
entiation the more diﬃcult it is to capture rents from the foreign country by
lowering emission taxes. Thus, with increasing marginal costs of pollution,
environmental considerations will always dominate if products are suﬃciently
diﬀerentiated, implying that product market integration leads to higher taxes.
4. Transnational Policy Coordination
In the coordinated policy regime, the two governments (or a transnational
governmental body) optimally set emission taxes to maximise joint welfare.
Thus, the maximisation problem is given by:
maxsi;sj W
i þWj  ¼ Ui þUj þ Si þ Sj 
 Di þDj  Ci þ Cj
 
i 6¼ j: ð25Þ
Performing our usual decomposition of policy incentives, and evaluating at
the symmetric cooperative equilibrium s1=s2=sc, we can now derive
@ Ui scð Þ þUj scð Þ½ 
@si
¼  2þ 1þ bð Þ 2sc þ tð Þ
2þ bð Þ2 <0; ð26Þ
@ Si scð Þ þ Sj scð Þ½ 
@si
¼ t
2þ b>0; ð27Þ
 @ D
i scð Þ þDj scð Þ½ 
@si
¼ D0ðÞð1þ aÞ 2
2þ bþ
1
c
 
>0: ð28Þ
 @ Ci scð Þ þ Cj scð Þ
 
@si
¼  si
c
<0: ð29Þ
Comparing with the non-cooperative solution, there are two important
aspects to note. First, incentives for rent-shifting are now eliminated. Instead,
the countries have a common incentive to increase taxes in order to reduce
costly trade, as illustrated by (27). Second, the marginal environmental
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beneﬁt of emission taxation is now increasing in a, since ‘pollution-shifting’
incentives are eliminated by policy coordination.
4.1. EQUILIBRIUM TAX RATES UNDER POLICY COORDINATION
Using (26)–(28), the optimal emission tax rate in the coordinated equilibrium
is given by the solution to
 2þ 2scð1þ bÞ  tð Þð2þ bÞ2 þD
0ðÞ 2ð1þ aÞ
2þ b þ
1
c
ð1þ aÞD0ðÞ  sc½  ¼ 0: ð30Þ
Once more, we can solve explicitly for the equilibrium tax rate in the coor-
dination regime by considering the special cases of linear and quadratic
damage costs. These are given, respectively, by
sc ¼ d 2þ bð Þ 2þ bþ 2cð Þ 1þ að Þ  c 2 tð Þ
2þ bð Þ2þ2c 1þ bð Þ ; ð31Þ
~sc ¼
2 tð Þc d 1þ að Þ2 2þ bþ 2cð Þ  c
 
d 2þ bþ 2cð Þ2 1þ að Þ2þc 2þ bð Þ2þ2c 1þ bð Þ
  : ð32Þ
4.2. DOES POLICY COORDINATION REDUCE POLLUTION?
With multiple distortions, transnational policy coordination does not nec-
essarily lead to higher emission taxes and reduced pollution. We can examine
the eﬀect of policy coordination by evaluating the changes in policy incen-
tives at the non-cooperative equilibrium. Policy coordination leads to a
tougher environmental policy (i.e., higher emission taxes) if
@Wj sncð Þ
@si
¼ @U
j sncð Þ
@si
þ @S
j sncð Þ
@si
 @D
j sncð Þ
@si
 @Cj sncð Þ
@si
>0:
Comparing (17) and (29), we see that there are no policy distortions with
respect to abatement costs. However, the remaining policy incentives are
aﬀected by coordination. Regarding considerations for consumer utility, we
ﬁnd that
@Uj sncð Þ
@si
¼  2 bð Þ
2 1þ snc 1þ bð Þ½  þ 4 3b2
 
t
ð4 b2Þ2
<0; ð33Þ
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which implies that coordination yields incentives for lower taxes. In the non-
coordination regime, each policy maker does not care about the share of
domestic production that is consumed by foreigners, so the full extent of the
under-provision problem is not taken into account. When national policies
are coordinated, though, this eﬀect is internalised.
The eﬀect of policy coordination on rent-shifting incentives is given by
@Sj sncð Þ
@si
¼ 2 bð Þ 2snc þ bð Þ þ 4 1 bð Þt
2 bð Þ2 2þ bð Þ >0: ð34Þ
From a comparison of (15) and (27), this eﬀect is obvious. By eliminating
rent-shifting incentives, policy coordination yields – all else equal – incentives
for a tougher environmental policy.
Finally, the change in policy incentives that is related to environmental
considerations is given by.
 @D
j sncð Þ
@si
¼ D0 ð Þ @X
j sncð Þ
@si
¼ D0 ð Þ 2 2a bð Þ
4 b2ð Þ þ
a
c
	 

: ð35Þ
We see that
 @D
j sncð Þ
@si
> <ð Þ0 iff a> <ð Þa^;
where
a^ :¼ 2bc
4cþ 4 b2ð Þ 2 0;
1
2
 
: ð36Þ
From the deﬁnition of a^, it follows that policy coordination always
increases the marginal environmental beneﬁt of emission taxes – implying,
all else equal, that taxes are increased – if a> 12 or if products are unrelated
(b=0), whereas the opposite is true if pollution is purely local (a=0). When
pollution is highly transboundary, non-coordinated policies imply too low
taxes – from an environmental perspective – because the negative exter-
nality on the other country’s environment is not taken into account.
However, when pollution is predominantly local, non-coordinated policies
imply excessively high taxes – still from an environmental perspective –
because each local policy maker is trying to shift polluting production to
the other country. This last eﬀect is more pronounced the less diﬀerentiated
the products are. We also observe that @a^@c>0, implying that a better
abatement technology (lower c) will increase the parameter space in which
policy coordination increases the marginal environmental beneﬁt of emis-
sion taxation.
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Comparing the strength of the diﬀerent policy incentives, we derive the
following result regarding the environmental eﬀect of policy coordination:11
Proposition 2. Suﬃcient conditions for transnational policy coordination to
reduce environmental pollution are b> 12
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
17
p  32  0:56 and a>a^.
Thus, unless products are too diﬀerentiated or pollution is predominantly
local, policy coordination will always lead to increased emission taxes. This
result is explained by two diﬀerent eﬀects. First, we know that rent-shifting
incentives in the non-cooperative regime are stronger the less diﬀerentiated
the products are. Thus, if products are suﬃciently close substitutes, the
elimination of rent-shifting incentives dominates the increased incentives for
alleviating the under-provision problem when national policies are coordi-
nated. If, in addition, pollution is transboundary to a suﬃcient degree,
environmental considerations also imply that policy coordination leads to
higher taxes. On the other hand, if products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated, or
if pollution is predominantly local, the environmental eﬀect of policy coor-
dination is generally ambiguous.12
Note that the conditions given in Proposition 2 are suﬃcient, but not
necessary. For the special case of linear damage costs, we are able to derive
an explicit necessary condition. In this case, policy coordination will increase
emission taxes, and thus reduce total environmental pollution, if
a>a :¼
1dð Þ
d 2 3b b2 þ 2c 1 bð Þ
  t2bð Þd 1 bð Þ 4þ 3cð Þ  b2
 
1
c 2 bð Þ 2þ bð Þ2þ7 2þ bð Þ þ 2c 3þ bð Þ  b2
:
ð37Þ
5. Product Market Integration and Policy Coordination
The degree of product market integration – interpreted as the level of trade
costs – is inﬂuential in determining the eﬀect of policy coordination. In this
Section we analyse how product market integration aﬀects the outcome of
policy coordination, with respect to changes in emission taxes, and ask
whether such integration increases the beneﬁt of coordination, both in terms
of total emission reductions and social welfare gains.
We start out by analysing how the eﬀect of policy coordination – in
terms of changes in equilibrium emission taxes – is determined by the
degree of product market integration. As follows from the analysis in the
previous Section, this is given by the second-order cross derivative @
2WjðsncÞ
@t@si
.
Again, we proceed by considering the decomposed eﬀects. Product market
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integration does not aﬀect incentives for reducing abatement costs (cf. (17)
and (29)), but the other policy incentives are all inﬂuenced by trade cost
reductions.
From (33) we have that
@2Uj sncð Þ
@t@si
¼  cþ 1þ bð Þ 2 bð Þ
2@snc
@t
4 b2ð Þ2
; ð38Þ
where
c :¼ 4 3b2>0:
By inserting the expression for @snc@t from (24) we derive
@2Uj sncð Þ
@t@si
¼

w c2þbþ c 1 bð Þ
h i
þ c22þb 12 9b2 þ b3
 þ cc 2 bð Þ
2 bð Þ2 c2 6þ 3b b2ð Þ þ c 2 bð Þ 2þ bð Þ2þw 2 1þ cð Þ þ bð Þ
h i<0:
ð39Þ
Since @U
jðsncÞ
@si
<0, it follows from (39) that product market integration reduces
the coordination eﬀect with respect to consumer utility. This result is
explained simply by the fact that lower trade costs leads to increased com-
petition. The subsequent decrease in consumer prices reduces the ineﬃciency
caused by imperfect competition in the ﬁrst place. Ceteris paribus, this means
that integration enlarges the parameter space in which policy coordination
results in higher emission taxes.
The relationship between trade costs and the coordination eﬀect on rent-
shifting incentives is derived from (34), yielding
@2Sj sncð Þ
@t@si
¼ 2 2 1 bð Þ þ 2 bð Þ
@snc
@t
2 bð Þ2 2þ bð Þ ; ð40Þ
from which, when inserting for @snc@t , we derive
@2Sj sncð Þ
@t@si
¼
2 2l wþ c 4 b2  þ 2c2 3lþ b3 þ wc 2 3bð Þ 
2 bð Þ2 2þ bð Þ c 2 bð Þ 2þ bð Þ2þc2 6þ 3b b2ð Þ þ w 2þ bþ 2cð Þ
h i ;
ð41Þ
PRODUCT MARKET INTEGRATION, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY COORDINATION 549
where
l :¼ ð2þ bÞð1 bÞ>0
A closer inspection of (41) shows that suﬃcient conditions for product
market integration to reduce the coordination eﬀect on rent-shifting
incentives, i.e., @
2SjðsncÞ
@t@si
>0, are b< 23 or D
00ðÞ ¼ 0. The intuition is somewhat
intricate, but still tractable. For a given level of emission taxes, integration
implies that incentives for rent-shifting activity in the non-cooperative
regime are increased – cf. (22). However, lower trade costs also reduce
incentives for using environmental policy to reduce the amount of two-way
trade in the coordination regime – cf. (27). For b<1, it turns out that the
second eﬀect dominates, implying that product market integration reduces
the coordination eﬀect on rent-shifting incentives, and more so the higher
the degree of product diﬀerentiation, because rent-shifting incentives are
then less sensitive to the level of trade costs in the non-cooperative regime.
These are the direct eﬀects. However, we are evaluating the coordination
eﬀects at the non-coordinated equilibrium, so a reduction of trade costs
also implies that snc changes. If
@snc
@t is positive, product market integration
means that snc goes down, which reduces the incentives for rent-shifting in
the non-coordinated regime. This reinforces the result that product market
integration reduces the coordination eﬀect on rent-shifting incentives.
Indeed, from Proposition 1 we know that @snc@t >0 if D
00(Æ)=0, which explains
why the characteristics of the damage cost function matters for the sign of
@2SjðsncÞ
@t@si
.
If @
2S jðsncÞ
@t@si
>0, consumer utility and rent-shifting incentives work in
opposite directions with respect to the eﬀects of policy coordination when
product markets become more integrated. Concerns for consumer utility put
a downward pressure on environmental taxes when national policies are
coordinated, but this pressure is reduced when trade costs are lowered.
Conversely, the elimination of rent-shifting incentives through policy coor-
dination puts an upward pressure on emission taxes, but this eﬀect is also
reduced by product market integration. In this case, the sum of these two
eﬀects are generally ambiguous.
Finally, then, let us see how the degree of product market integration
determines the coordination eﬀect on incentives to reduce pollution. From
(35) we have that
 @
2Dj sncð Þ
@t@si
¼ D00 ð Þ @X
j sncð Þ
@si
@snc
@s
þ @X
j sncð Þ
@t
 
2 2a bð Þ
4 b2ð Þ þ
a
c
 
: ð42Þ
By inserting for @X
jðsncÞ
@si
; @X
jðsncÞ
@t and
@snc
@t we drive
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 @
2Dj sncð Þ
@t@si
¼
1þ að ÞD00 ð Þ c 6 3bþ b2 þ 8 4bþ b3   2c b 2að Þ  a 4 b2  
2 bð Þ2 2þ bð Þ w 2þ 2cþ bð Þ þ c2 6þ 3b b2ð Þ þ c 2 bð Þ 2þ bð Þ2
h i :
We can ﬁrst note that  @2DjðsncÞ@t@si ¼ 0 if the marginal social cost of pollution is
constant. Since the marginal eﬀect of taxation on emissions is independent of
trade costs, product market integration does not inﬂuence the coordination
eﬀect on incentives for emission reductions if marginal damage costs are
independent of the level of pollution. For strictly convex damage costs,
however, we see that  @2DjðsncÞ@t@si >0 if a<a^. In this case – when pollution is
predominantly local – environmental considerations put a downward pressure
on emission taxes when national policies are coordinated, due to the elimi-
nation of ‘pollution-shifting’ incentives.13 A reduction of trade costs implies
that total production increases, with an equivalent increase in total emissions.
Due to the convexity of the damage cost function, higher emissions increase
the incentives to shift polluting production to the other country by setting
high taxes in the non-coordinated regime. Consequently, lower trade costs
imply that the coordination eﬀect increases. All else equal, product market
integration then increases the parameter space – due to purely environmental
considerations – in which coordination leads to lower emission taxes! The
‘inverse intuition’ applies when a>a^.
5.1. ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION
From an environmentalist perspective, a key question is whether or not
product market integration increases the environmental gain of policy
coordination. In other words: how does product market integration inﬂuence
the eﬀectiveness of transnational policy coordination as a means to reduce
pollution?
We interpret the ‘environmental gain’ of policy coordination simply as the
reduction of total environmental pollution in country i, i.e., XiðscÞ  XiðsncÞ.
Since equilibrium pollution is linear in taxes, and the marginal eﬀect of
taxation on total emissions is independent of trade costs, product market
integration will increase the environmental gain (or reduce the loss) of policy
coordination if @ scsncð Þ@t <0.
14
Since @ scsncð Þ@t <0 if
@2Wj sncð Þ
@t@si
<0, the answer to the posed question is found
by considering the sum of the previously analysed decomposed eﬀects.
However, in order to derive somewhat more clear-cut answers, we consider
the special cases of linear and quadratic damage cost functions. The
relationship between the degree of product market integration and the
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environmental eﬀect of transnational policy coordination can then be sum-
marised as follows.
Proposition 3. (i) With linear damage costs, product market integration
reduces the environmental gain of policy coordination unless b  b, where b is
an increasing function of the abatement cost parameter c, and given by
b :¼ 1
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð3cþ 8Þð3cþ 4Þ
p
 4 3c
 
2 ð0:83; 1Þ:
(ii) With a quadratic damage cost function, product market integration reduces
the environmental gain of policy coordination if both a and b are suﬃciently
small.
From an environmental perspective, it appears that the process of
increased product market integration between countries does not neces-
sarily imply an increased need for transnational policy coordination.
Unless products are very close substitutes, this is actually never the case
when the social marginal cost of pollution is constant, so that the ‘scale
eﬀect’ of increased integration does not aﬀect the marginal incentives for
reducing pollution.15 But even with a strictly convex damage cost function,
increased integration reduces the environmental gain from policy coordi-
nation if products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated and pollution is predomi-
nantly local.
As the previous analysis indicates, two diﬀerent eﬀects contribute to this
result. First, lower trade costs reduce the incentives to keep taxes high in the
coordination regime in order to reduce total outlay on trade costs. Second,
and perhaps most noteworthy, product market integration increases the
incentives for ‘pollution-shifting’ in the non-coordinated regime if a is suﬃ-
ciently low, and these incentives are eliminated through policy coordination.
Thus, if pollution is predominantly local, product market integration could
lower the environmental gain from policy coordination due to purely envi-
ronmental considerations.
Finally, it should be noted that we have used changes in total emissions as
the measure of the environmental gain of policy coordination. An alternative
measure is the social valuation of such changes, as represented by the damage
cost function D. If D is linear in total emissions, there is of course a
monotonous correspondence between the two measures. However, if D is
strictly convex, the social valuation of a given reduction in total emissions
depends on the initial level of pollution, which, in turn, depends on the degree
of product market integration. Although a full analytical characterisation is
infeasible, numerical simulations suggest that results are qualitatively similar
for the two measures.
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5.2. SOCIAL WELFARE
Let us now turn to the eﬀect of product market integration and policy
coordination on social welfare, which is arguably the more relevant per-
spective when assessing the need for transnational policy coordination. Even
if integration reduces the environmental gain from coordination, it may well
be that incentives for policy coordination increase from a viewpoint of social
welfare. Due to the distorted incentives in the non-cooperative game, there is
always a welfare gain from policy coordination. Furthermore, the symmetry
of the model ensures that the cooperative solution is in the core. Our concern,
however, is how product market integration aﬀects the welfare gain of policy
coordination. In other words, does product market integration bring social
welfare in the non-cooperative equilibrium closer to the eﬃcient (second-
best) level?
Due to analytical tractability, we will here focus on the two special cases of
linear and quadratic damage cost functions. In the ﬁrst case, when the
marginal social cost of pollution is constant, equilibrium emission taxes in
the two policy regimes are given by (19) and (31). From these, the social
welfare gain of policy coordination can be derived by straightforward cal-
culation:
Wi scð Þ Wi sncð Þ ¼ 2þ bð Þ
2U2
2 2 bð Þ2cb2 2þ bð Þ2þ2c 1þ bð Þ
h i ; ð44Þ
where
U :¼cð2 bÞð1 dÞ½2 3b b2 þ 2cð1 bÞ
 adð2 bÞ ð2 bÞð2þ bÞ2 þ cð7ð2þ bÞ þ 2cð3þ bÞ  b2Þ
h i
 tc½ð4þ 3cÞð1 bÞ  b2;
b :¼ ð2 bÞð2þ bÞ2 þ cð6þ 3b b2Þ>0:
From (44) we are able to derive the following result:
Proposition 4. If the marginal social cost of pollution is constant, product
market integration reduces the welfare gain of policy coordination if
sc>snc and b<b.
When seen in conjunction with (37), the Proposition implies that product
market integration will reduce the need for policy coordination – from a
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social welfare perspective – if pollution is transboundary to a suﬃcient
degree: a>a. From the deﬁnition of b (given in Proposition 3), this result
always holds if b<0.83. Note also that b<b is a suﬃcient, but not necessary,
condition. It proves infeasible to provide a necessary condition, but numer-
ical simulations suggest that the result given in Proposition 4 – that inte-
gration reduce the welfare gain of coordination if such coordination leads to
higher emission taxes – also holds for b  b in the vast majority of cases.
The intuition behind this result can be explained by considering the
coordination eﬀects on total pollution and rent-shifting incentives. The key
factor is the condition sc>snc. When trade costs are strictly positive, sc>snc
implies not only that policy coordination reduces the social costs of pollu-
tion, but also that the net trade surplus for each country increases.16 This
follows from the fact that higher taxes dampen the ﬁrms’ rent-capturing
incentives and reduce the amount of costly trade. However, product market
integration reduces these trade costs, implying that the positive eﬀect of
policy coordination on the net trade surplus is reduced correspondingly. In
addition, we already know – from Proposition 3 – that product market
integration reduces the environmental gain of policy coordination if b<b.
These two eﬀects combined always dominate the eﬀect on consumer utility.
For the case of a quadratic damage cost function, it proves infeasible to
derive analytical results. Consequently, we present our results in the form of
numerical examples, using the equilibrium emission taxes given by (20) and
(32). Table I presents the eﬀect of product market integration on the welfare
gain of policy coordination for diﬀerent values of the key parameters a and b.
The results in Table I are presented for a single value of each of the
remaining parameters d and c, but several numerical simulations with other
parameter values produce qualitatively similar results.
A clear pattern emerges: product market integration reduces the welfare
gain of policy coordination if products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated and
pollution is predominantly local. These cases are highlighted in bold type in
Table I. Welfare gain of policy coordination: Wið~sÞc Wið~sncÞ
t
b=0.2 b=0.5 b=0.8
a=0.2 a=0.8 a=0.2 a=0.8 a=0.2 a=0.8
0 0.0001 0.0343 0.0012 0.0529 0.0037 0.0818
0.1 0.0003 0.0333 0.0014 0.0503 0.0037 0.0758
0.2 0.0005 0.0322 0.0017 0.0478 0.0037 0.0700
0.3 0.0007 0.0312 0.0020 0.0453 0.0036 0.0645
0.4 0.0010 0.0301 0.0023 0.0429 0.0036 0.0591
0.5 0.0014 0.0291 0.0026 0.0406 0.0036 0.0540
Assumptions: c=10, d=1.
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Table I. There are two interesting features of these results. First, it is
conﬁrmed that product market integration may indeed reduce the need for
policy coordination also in the case of a quadratic damage cost function.
Second, compared with the case of linear damage costs, we see that the
results are partially reversed with respect to the key parameter a. In the linear
case, product market integration reduced the welfare gain of policy coordi-
nation if a was suﬃciently high, while a must be suﬃciently low to produce
this result with quadratic damage costs.
This illustrates indeed that the characteristics of the social damage cost
function plays an important role for the coordination eﬀects of product
market integration. Intuitively, the reason why the properties of the damage
cost function matter should be connected to the environmental eﬀect of
policy coordination. This is conﬁrmed by juxtaposing Table I with the sec-
ond part of Proposition 3, where we see that suﬃciently low values of a and b
are precisely the conditions securing that product market integration reduces
the environmental gain of policy coordination when social damage costs are
quadratic in the level of pollution. From Table 1 it follows that the social
welfare gain of policy coordination is correspondingly reduced.
6. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
It is often claimed that the process of international product market integration
contributes towards undermining national environmental policy making and
increasing incentives for ‘eco-dumping’. The obvious response is to call for
environmental policies to be transnationally coordinated. In this paper we
have studied how the degree of product market integration aﬀects the gains of
policy coordination, with respect to both environmental pollution reductions
and social welfare, in a context of imperfect competition and reciprocal trade.
Within the framework of an international Cournot duopoly, we ﬁnd that
product market integration – interpreted as a reduction of trade costs
between countries – does not necessarily increase the gain of transnational
policy coordination, neither from an environmental nor from a welfare
perspective. If the marginal social cost of pollution is constant, product
market integration always reduce the environmental gain of policy coordi-
nation (unless products are close to homogeneous), while the welfare gain of
coordination is reduced if such coordination leads to higher emission taxes.
On the other hand, if the social damage cost function is quadratic, product
market integration reduces both the environmental and welfare gain of
coordination if products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated and pollution is pre-
dominantly local. Thus, our results suggest that the process of economic
integration of product markets might reduce the need for transnational
policy coordination, not only from a purely environmentalist perspective, but
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also from a viewpoint of aggregate social welfare. To the extent that product
market integration is the result of political decisions, integration and coor-
dination can then be viewed as (imperfect) ‘policy substitutes’.
The analysis rests on the key assumption that there are more policy goals
than instruments, so that diﬀerent (and often conﬂicting) policy incentives
must be balanced by the use of a single policy instrument. This is a funda-
mental premise in the literature on strategic environmental policy, and is
justiﬁed by the widespread and increasing unavailability of traditional trade
policy instruments due to free trade agreements and other types of trans-
national regulation, such as the European CommonMarket. In our model, to
make things fairly simple, we have focused on an emission tax as the only
available policy instrument. It should be noted, though, that although the
availability of more policy instruments would better empower policy makers
to reach their objectives, incentives to seek foreign rents and to shift pollution
elsewhere will still be present among policy makers who interact strategically
in a non-cooperative policy game.
In order to provide tractable results for a rather complicated problem, the
analysis has been undertaken within a fairly stylised modelling framework. It
is thus natural to ask if and how the results are aﬀected by alternative
modelling assumptions. In the following we will discuss likely eﬀects of some
extensions or alternative assumptions. It is unfeasible to give clear-cut
answers to the impact on the main results of the paper, but it is, in most cases,
possible to say something about how the diﬀerent policy incentives are likely
to be aﬀected.
It is well known from strategic trade literature that policy incentives are
sensitive to the mode of product market competition. An obvious alternative
assumption is to let the ﬁrms engage in Bertrand competition and set prices
instead of quantities. How is this likely to aﬀect our results? Most impor-
tantly, the mode of competition aﬀects optimal non-cooperative policies with
respect to rent-shifting incentives. With price competition, the optimal rent-
shifting policy is an export tax, rather than a subsidy (see, e.g., Eaton and
Grossman 1986). In our context, this means that emission taxes should tend
to be higher under Bertrand competition. In addition, we also know that
Bertrand competition yields lower equilibrium prices, compared with the
Cournot assumption (see, e.g., Singh and Vives 1984). This implies that
incentives for keeping emission taxes low in order stimulate competition and
increase consumer utility are reduced. Furthermore, lower prices – and thus
higher output – means that total emissions are higher. If the social damage
cost function is strictly convex, this should increase incentives for using
emission taxes to reduce environmental pollution. Since all these eﬀects pull
in the same direction, we should generally expect higher equilibrium emission
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taxes in industries that are characterised by Bertrand competition, both in the
cooperative and non-cooperative regime.
It is also natural to ask what would happen if we depart from the duopoly
assumption. In an n-ﬁrm oligopoly, the number of ﬁrms in the industry will
generally aﬀect incentives for strategic environmental policy. More ﬁrms will
increase competition in the industry, which reduces the under-provision
problem and increases total emissions. As explained above, this should – all
else equal – lead to higher emission taxes in equilibrium. Furthermore,
increased competition also introduces a new eﬀect with respect to rent-
shifting incentives. With more than one ﬁrm in each country, each ‘domestic’
ﬁrm imposes a negative externality on other domestic ﬁrms in the export
market. A domestic policy maker can partly alleviate this eﬀect by raising
emission taxes.17 Like in the case of Bertrand competition, equilibrium
emission taxes are expected to increase.
The present model implicitly assumes that each policy maker can commit
to a particular tax policy before ﬁrms make their strategic decisions. How-
ever, the degree of commitment power might diﬀer between national policy
makers. If so, it might be more appropriate to assume that the government in
one country is a Stackelberg leader vis-a`-vis the government in the other
country. This makes the model – and thus the equilibrium outcoume –
asymmetric, since emission taxes will generally diﬀer between the countries in
the non-cooperative equilibrium. For that reason it is hard to produce
analytical results. However, numerical simulations suggest that relative
changes in equilibrium tax rates, compared with two-stage simultaneous
move game, are generally very small. The exception is the case of highly
transboundary pollution. In this case, the Stackelberg leader will generally set
a markedly lower emission tax rate than the Stackelberg follower. If there are
little or no incentives for ‘pollution-shifting’, the Stackelberg leader will
commit to a very low tax rate in order to capture more rents from the foreign
country. For a large set of parameters, though, results are expected to be
quite similar between the two model variants.
In line with the bulk of the literature on strategic environmental policy,
the present analysis has been performed within a partial equilibrium frame-
work. Although this framework is suitable for studying strategic interaction,
there might be potentially important general equilibrium eﬀects that are
omitted. For example, Rauscher (1994) and Elbers and Withagen (2002a, b)
show that general equilibrium models might produce qualitatively diﬀerent
results than partial equilibrium models. In a general equilibrium framework,
environmental policies will generally aﬀect the allocation of resources (capital
and labour) in the economy through the rate of return and thereby the overall
eﬀect of such policies. More speciﬁcally, lower emission taxes in a sector is
likely to reduce the price of goods produced in this sector and induce an
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outﬂow of resources to other sectors in the economy. With non-discrimina-
tory emission taxes, Rauscher (1994) argues that lower emission taxes might
cause a positive net ﬂow of production factors to non-tradable sectors. This
could yield opposite result in the sense that rent-shifting incentives might
imply higher, rather than lower, emission taxes. However, it is also possible
to identify general equilibrium eﬀects that could reinforce incentives for ‘eco-
dumping’. For example, environmental policies might be used as an instru-
ment to inﬂuence the location of ﬁrms in an international industry. More
speciﬁcally, a national policy maker might induce entry of foreign ﬁrms by
lowering emission taxes. This eﬀect is identiﬁed by, e.g., Pﬂu¨ger (2001) and
Neary (2006) in general equilibrium models of economic geography. Thus, it
is hard to predict whether and how general equilibrium eﬀects are likely to
qualitatively inﬂuence the overall results.
Finally, it should be said that the quest for analytical tractability has
necessitated the use of some speciﬁc functional forms. The generality of our
results is thus limited by the use of linearity assumptions with respect to
demand and technology. However, from the discussion of the diﬀerent policy
incentives we believe that the qualitative nature of these incentives are fairly
general. Furthermore, in the cases where opposing forces produce ambiguous
results – which is a general feature of the entire analysis – these ambiguities
will obviously persist under more general assumptions.
Acknowledgements
This paper was partly written during a visit at Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin
fu¨r Sozialforschung (WZB), whose hospitality is gratefully acknowledged.
Comments and suggestions from Kjell Erik Lommerud, Frode Meland and
two anonymous referees are also greatly appreciated.
Notes
1. A related body of literature focus on the interaction between trade policy and
environmental policy instrument, see, e.g., Walz and Wellisch (1997) and Tanguay (2001).
2. Incentives for ‘ecolocigal dumping’ when plant locations are endogenous are analysed by,
e.g., Markusen et al. (1993, 1995), Hoel (1997) and Ulph and Valentini (2001). In a related
context, Buchholz and Konrad (1994) study the strategic choice of technology adoption.
There is also a large body of literature on environmental polices and trade in a competitive
framework, see, e.g., Copeland and Taylor (1994, 1995).
3. In a similar type of framework, and still without any trade costs, Duval and Hamilton
(2002) study strategic environmental policy when markets are asymmetric.
4. Regarding notation, the following convention is adopted throughout the paper: subscripts
attached to a variable indicate the ﬁrm/product, whereas superscripts indicate the country.
5. This is not the only plausible way to model transboundary pollution. An alternative
speciﬁcation could be Xi ¼ ð1 aÞEi þ aEj. This would, however, not change our results
qualitatively.
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6. From (9) we see that whether or not the equilibrium is characterised by two-way trade also
depends on the level of emission taxes. These are, however, endogenously determined in
the model. Under the basic assumption that taxes are never set so high that ﬁrms do not
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to operate even in their home markets, the assumption of two-way trade
boils down to the assumption that trade costs are suﬃciently low. For zero emission taxes,
two-way trade prevails if t<1  b2. For a related discussion in a similiar type of model, see
also Naylor (1998, 1999), where production costs of ﬁrms are determined by monopoly
trade unions.
7. Explicit expressions for the diﬀerent welfare components are given in Appendix
8. In order to save notation, we apply the notational shorthand @U
iðsncÞ
@si
for
@Uiðsi;sjÞ
@si

si¼sj¼snc
.
This practice is adopted throughout the paper.
9. As observed by Barnett (1980), imperfectly competitive and polluting ﬁrms may under-
produce from a social perspective if the market power eﬀect outweighs the environmental
damages.
10. This ‘pollution-shifting’ eﬀect was identiﬁed by Kennedy (1994).
11. The proof of this and all subsequent Propositions are given in Appendix.
12. In a setting of imperfect competition and strategic environmental policy, Greaker
(2003) also observes the possibility that policy coordination could lead to lower
emission taxes, but for diﬀerent reasons. In his model, the possibility that higher
emission taxes could reduce the marginal cost of production (emissions as an ‘inferior
input’ to production) implies that taxes will be set excessively high in the non-
cooperative equilibrium.
13. Remember that  @DjðsncÞ@si <0 when a<ba.
14. Since the sign of (sc) snc) is generally ambiguous, we can also make the following
interpretation: @ðscsncÞ@t <ð>Þ0 implies that product market integration enlarges (reduces)
the parameter space in which policy coordination will reduce environmental pollution.
15. Furthermore, since @X
iðsncÞ
@t <0 (due to the ‘scale eﬀect’ of integration) it follows that
product market integration reduces the relative environmental gain from policy
coordination even more.
16. It is straightforward to verify that SiðscÞ>SiðsncÞ iﬀ a>a.
17. See, e.g., Dixit (1984) for a further discussion of the eﬀect of market structure on strategic
trade policy incentives in an international oligopoly.
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Appendix
A. SOCIAL WELFARE COMPONENTS AS FUNCTIONS OF EMISSION TAX RATES
Social welfare in country i is deﬁned by (11) . Inserting the equilibrium expressions from the
product market subgame, given by (8)–(10), we derive the following expressions for the dif-
ferent welfare components as functions of emission tax rates:
Uiðsi; sjÞ ¼
2ð2 bÞ2ð3þ b t si  sjÞ  c s2i þ s2j þ tð2sj þ tÞ
 
 2b3siðtþ sjÞ
2ð4 b2Þ2 ;
ðA1Þ
Siðsi; sjÞ ¼ ð2 bÞ½ðsj  siÞðbþ si þ sjÞ  2t
2  t½ð1 siÞb2 þ 4ð1 bÞð1 sjÞ
ð2 bÞ2ð2þ bÞ ; ðA2Þ
Diðsi; sjÞ :¼ DiðXi si; sjÞ
 
;
where
Xiðsi; sjÞ ¼ ðsi þ asjÞð4ð1þ cÞ  b
2Þ  2cbðasi þ sjÞ  ð2 bÞð2 tÞð1þ aÞc
ð4 b2Þc ; ðA3Þ
ciðsi; sjÞ ¼  s
2
i
2c
: ðA4Þ
B. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Policy coordination yields higher emission taxes, and thus reduces pollution, if
@WjðsncÞ
@si
¼ @U
jðsncÞ
@si
þ @S
jðsncÞ
@si
 @D
jðsncÞ
@si
 @C
jðsncÞ
@si
>0:
We know that @C
jðsncÞ
@si
¼ 0: From (33) and (34) we derive
@UjðsncÞ
@si
þ @S
jðsncÞ
@si
¼
4ð1 bÞtþ ð2 bÞð3bþ b2  2Þ þ sncð2 bÞð2þ bþ b2Þ  b2t
ð2þ bÞ2ð2 bÞ2 :
ðB1Þ
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Under the assumption that snc ‡ 0, a suﬃcient condition for this expression to be positive is
b> 12
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
17
p  32  0:56. Finally, from (35) we have that
 @D
jðsncÞ
@si
>0 iff a>ba :¼ 2bc
4cþ ðbþ 2Þð2 bÞ :
Thus, suﬃcient conditions for @W
jðsncÞ
@si
>0 are b> 12
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
17
p  32 and a>ba. QED.
C. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
(i) Setting D¢¢ (Æ)=0 in (39), (41) and (43), we have that
@2WjðsncÞ
@t@si
¼ ð1 bÞð4þ 3cÞ  b
2
ð2 bÞ ð2 bÞð2þ bÞ2 þ cð6þ 3b b2Þ
h i : ðC1Þ
This sign of this expression depends on the sign of the numerator, and we see that
@2WjðsncÞ
@t@si
>0 iff b<b :¼ 1
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð3cþ 8Þð3cþ 4Þ
p
 4 3c
 
:
Since @
b
@c>0 for c ‡ 0, limc!0 b ¼ 2ð
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p  1Þ  0:83, and limc!1 b ¼ 1, we can conclude that
b 2 ð0:83; 1Þ. (ii) From (20) and (32) we derive
@ð~sc  ~sncÞ
@t
¼ ½c½ð4þ 3cÞð1 bÞ  b
2 þ dð1þ aÞWð2þ bÞ2c2
dð2þ bþ 2cÞ2ð1þ aÞ2 þ c 2cð1þ bÞ þ ð2þ bÞ2
 h i
Xð2 bÞ
; ðC2Þ
where
W :¼ cð1 bÞð6þ bþ 2cÞ  acð14 5bþ b2  2bcþ 6cÞ
bð4þ bÞ þ 4ð1þ baÞ  að4 2bþ b2Þð2þ bÞ;
X :¼ dð2þ bþ 2cÞð1þ aÞð4þ 2cð2 baÞ  b2Þ
þcð8þ 2bð2 bÞ þ 3cð2þ bÞ  b2ðbþ cÞÞ:
Since W>0, the sign of @ð~sc~sncÞ@t is determined by the sign of the numerator in (C2). Deﬁne
Q: =c[(4+3c)(1)b))b2]+d(1+a)Y. Then sign @ð~sc~sncÞ@t
 
¼ signH. It is easily veriﬁed that Q is
monotonically decreasing in both a and b. Now assume that b=1. Then we have that
H ¼ ½cþ dþ adð6þ 5aþ 2cð5þ 2cÞð1þ aÞÞ<0
Thus, @ð~sc~sncÞ@t <0 if b is suﬃciently high. Now assume that b=0. In this case we have
H ¼ cð4þ 3cÞ þ 2dð2þ 3cÞ  2adðcþ 1Þ½2ð1þ cÞ þ að4þ 3cÞ;
which is positive if
a<~a :¼
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
dð1þ cÞ cð4þ 3cÞ2 þ 2dð1þ cÞð3þ 2cÞ2
 r
 2dð1þ cÞ2
6d 43þ c
 ð1þ cÞ : ðC3Þ
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It is possible to show that ~a  13 for all c ‡ 0 and d ‡ 0. This suggests that @ð~sc~sncÞ@t >0 if both b
and a are suﬃciently small. We can ﬁnally conﬁrm this by setting a=b=0. In this case, we
have that
H ¼ 4cþ 4dþ 6cdþ 3c2 þ 2c2d>0:
QED.
D. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
From (44) we derive
@½WiðscÞ WiðsncÞ
@t
¼  ð2þ bÞ
2U½ð4þ 3cÞð1 bÞ  b2
ð2 bÞ2b2 ð2þ bÞ2 þ 2cð1þ bÞ
h i ; ðD1Þ
where U60 and b>0 have been deﬁned in Section 5. Thus, suﬃcient conditions for
@½WiðscÞWiðsncÞ
@t >0 are F>0 and (4+3c)(1)b))b
2>0. The latter condition can be expressed as
b<b, where b is deﬁned in Proposition 3, while U>0 iff a>a, where a is deﬁned by (37). From
the deﬁnition of a it follows that sc>snc iff a>a. QED.
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